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Abstract
Contrary to the widespread belief that game repetition induces conciliatory behavior, in a repeated battle of the
sexes where player 1 values the future and player 2 is myopic, player 1 is more inclined through conflicting
behavior to risk a conflict in the present when the future is important, and/or there are many periods left in the
game.
Should players choose conflict today to reap benefits tomorrow? The results in today’s literature
are mixed. Folk theorem arguments (Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986) exemplified by repeating the
prisoner’s dilemma (Axelrod, 1984) are often taken to imply cooperation in long-term relationships.
This result is often applied uncritically out of context. Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1996) equip
each agent with a resource, which can be allocated into production versus arms. They show that
increased importance of the future may harm cooperation.
This article considers neither the prisoner’s dilemma nor resource division into production versus
arms, but considers the repeated battle of the sexes in Table 1 where a1zb1zt1, b2za2zt2 and 
where a1zd1, b2Nd2, o r a1Nd1, b2zd2. Does increased importance of the future induce conciliatory
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Table 1
Two-person two-strategy game
I II
I a1=4, a2=3 t1=2, t2=2
II d1=1, d2=1 b1=3, b2=4or conflicting behavior when players have incomplete information1 about how tough they are? Are
the players indifferent to the discount factor? Which role does the number of game repetitions play? This
article answers these questions.
Players 1 and 2 have discount factors 0Vd1V1 and d2=0, which means that player 2 is 100%
myopic.2 Consider (a1,a2)=(4,3) preferred by row player 1, the starting point of our analysis, by
assuming that both players have a common conjecture that they will both play their first strategy.
Column player 2 has an incentive to switch strategy from I to II. Player 1 resists switching from I to II in
each period with a probability of 0Va1V1, which expresses how tough player 1 is. If he is tough, the
threat point (t1,t2) is reached where both are worse off. Player 1 is weak with a probability of 1a1, and
resists only when his expected payoff from resisting is larger than when acquiescing. If player 1 is weak,
player 2’s preferred (b1,b2)=(3,4) is reached. Player 1 gets to know player 2’s choice before he chooses.
3
In a one-period game, player 1 acquiesces to a challenge if he is weak. A weak player 2 thus challenges
when:
1 a1ð Þb2 þ a1t2 N a2Z a1b b2  a2
b2  t2 : ð1Þ
Player 2 is tough with a probability of 0Va2V1 (is 100% certain to challenge) and weak with a
probability of 1a2 (challenges only when his expected payoff from challenging is larger than
when not challenging). In a two-period game, a weak player 1 acquiesces in period 1 when:
t1 þ d1

1 a2ð Þa1 þ a2b1

b b1 þ d1b1Z a2 N 1 b1  t1d1 a1  b1ð Þ : ð2Þ
On the left side of the inequality in Eq. (2), the term d1a2b1 follows since a weak player 1 acquiesces
in period 2 to a tough player 2, which emerges with a probability of a2. A weak player 2 challenges in
period 1 when Eq. (1) is satisfied, and acquiesces otherwise. He challenges in period 2 if player 1
acquiesces in period 1, and does not challenge in period 2 if player 1 resists in period 1. When Eq. (1) is
not satisfied, the weak player 1 resists with probability 1 in period 1, and the weak player 2 does not1 This allows a realistic role for reputation, which presumes several players in the game, that at least one player has private
information that persists over time, that this player is likely to take several actions in sequence, and that the player is unable to 
commit in advance to the sequence of actions he will take (Wilson, 1985, p. 29).
2
This equivalently bcorresponds to a sequence of short run players.Q Player 2 plays ba short-run best response in each period. 
The best possible commitment for dplayer 1T is to the Stackelberg strategy for the corresponding static gameQ (Celentani et al., 
1996, p. 691).
3
The subsequent analysis is similar to Fudenberg and Tirole’s (1991, pp. 369–374) analysis of the chain store game.
Table 2
Conciliatory versus conflicting behavior
a2ba2(N,d1) a2Na2(N,d1)
a1ba1(N) Player 1 resists, player 2 challenges: (t1,t2) Player 1 acquiesces, player 2 challenges: (b1,b2)
a1Na1(N) Player 1 resists, player 2 acquiesces: (a1,a2) Player 1 acquiesces, player 2 acquiesces: (d1,d2)challenge in period 1. When Eq. (1) is satisfied, the weak player 1 randomizes, which requires that when
player 1 resists in period 1, the weak player 2 randomizes in a way that makes the weak player 1
indifferent in his randomizing in period 1. This requires that the posterior probability that player 1 is
tough, conditional on fighting, equals Eq. (1) as an equality i.e., a1=(b2a2)/(b2t2). Defining b as the
conditional probability that a weak player 1 resists in period 1, applying Bayes’ rule gives:
Pr tough=resistð Þ ¼ Pr toughð Þ \ Pr resistð Þ
Pr resistð Þ ¼
a1
a1 þ 1þ a1ð Þb ¼
b2  a2
b2  t2
Z b ¼ a1 a2  t2ð Þ
1 a1ð Þ b2  a2ð Þ : ð3Þ
The total probability that player 1 resists in period 1 is:
a1d1þ 1 a1ð Þ a1 a2  t2ð Þ
1 a1ð Þ b2  a2ð Þ ¼
a1 b2  t2ð Þ
b2  a2ð Þ : ð4Þ
Applying analogous reasoning to that leading to Eq. (1), a weak player 2 challenges in period 1 when:
1 a1 b2  t2ð Þ
b2  a2ð Þ
 
b2 þ a1 b2  t2ð Þ
b2  a2ð Þ t2Na2Z a1b
b2  a2
b2  t2
 2
¼ a1 2ð Þ; ð5Þ
and acquiesces otherwise. In a three-period game where a1N((b2a2)/(b2t2))2, a weak player 1
resists a challenge and a weak player 2 does not challenge. If ((b2a2)/(b2t2))3ba1b((b2a2)/
(b2t2))2, a weak player 1 randomizes and a weak player 2 does not challenge. If a1b((b2a2)/
(b2t2))3, a weak player 1 randomizes and a weak player 2 challenges. In a finitely repeated
game, a weak player 2 does not challenge until the first period where N periods remain and:
a1b
b2  a2
b2  t2
 N
¼ a1 Nð Þ: ð6Þ
Hence, the size of a1 required to deter a challenge
4 from player 2, when a2 is sufficiently small,
shrinks geometrically at the rate (b2a2)/(b2t2) as N increases. When N is large even a very small a1
may deter the challenge. A weak player 1 deters the challenge when54 If (a1,a2)=(4,3) represents a monopoly situation for player 1, the term bentry deterrenceQ expresses that player 2 does not
challenge.
5
Analogously to (9.2) player 1 receives b1 if player 2 is tough in period N, and t1 if player 2 is tough in periods 2 to N1. See 
Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, pp. 373-381) for mixed-strategy reputations.
Fig. 1. a1(N) and a2(N,d1) as functions of d1 for various N.t1 þ d1 1 a2ð Þa1 þ a2t1ð Þ 1 d
N2
1
1 d1
 
þ dN11 1 a2ð Þa1 þ a2b1ð ÞNb1
1 dN1
1 d1
 
Za2b
a1d1 1 dN11
  b1 1 dN1 þ t1 1 d1ð Þ
d1 a1 1 dN11
  b1dN21 1 d1ð Þ  t1 1 dN21   ¼ a2 N ; d1ð Þ; Nz2: ð7Þ
Eqs. (6) and (7) establish, uniquely dependent on a1 and a2, how the game is played and which 
payoffs (a1,a2), (t1,t2), and (b1,b2) accrue to the players in each period. Player 2 challenges when player 
1’s toughness a1 is low. Player 1 resists when player 2’s toughness a2 is low (see Table 2).
Figs. 1 and 2 illustrate with numbers in Table 1. a1(N) is independent of d1, and decreases in N. Player 
2’s challenge does not depend on d1 (due to myopia). When many periods N remain, player 2 does not 
challenge even when a1 is small, although decreasing a1 further causes player 2 to challenge. a2(N,d1)Fig. 2. a1(N) and a2(N,d1) as functions of N for various d1.
increases in both N and d1. Player 1 resists the challenge when a2 is low. As N or d1 increases, player 1
resists the challenge even when a2 is high, but not when too high.
The equilibrium strategies are: player 2 either challenges always (a1 is low), or starts the
challenge in period 2 or thereafter (a1 is intermediate), or challenges never (a1 is high). Player 1
either resists always (a2 is low), or resists halfway through the game and thereafter acquiesces (a2
is intermediate), or acquiesces in all periods (a2 is high).
Eq. (7) expresses that for a given a2, player 1 is more inclined to resist a challenge when the future is
important (d1 is large) and the game has many periods (N is large). The myopic player 2 is, for a given
a1, more inclined to challenge the fewer periods N left of the game. Inserting N=2 and N=l into Eq. (7)
gives Eqs. (2) and (8), respectively. When N=l, player 1 deters the challenge in an infinitely repeated
game when:
t1 þ d1 1 a2ð Þa1 þ a2t1
1 d1 N
b1
1 d1
Z a2 b 1 b1  t1d1 a1  t1ð Þ ¼ a2 l; d1ð ÞZ d1N
b1  t1
1 a2ð Þ a1  t1ð Þ : ð8Þ
Summing up, player 1 is more inclined through conflicting behavior and deterrence to risk a conflict
in the present when the future is more important (d1 is large), and/or there are many periods N left in the
game, given that player 2 is sufficiently inclined not to challenge (a2 is small).References
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